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About one-third of them, however,
under their Chiefs
Dull Knife
and
Little Wolf, finally made
their escape, notwithstanding that their designs had been suspected,
and increased care had been taken to prevent it. In the night, early
in September, about 90 men, 100 women, and more than 100 children left
their lodges standing and went out into the darkness for a destination
nearly a thousand miles away, on a road beset with foes, and pursued
from the start by a force of cavalry little less than that of the
warriors of the party. Without tentage or shelter of any kind, save
what they could carry on their horses, at a season of the year when
there are marked alternations in the temperature, the nights being
cold and the days very warm, through a country one - half of which on
their route was inhabited, though sparsely, by whites; with the
railroads and telegraph at the disposal of their pursuers;
burdened with about 250 women and children-this desperate band set out
on their almost hopeless retreat.
The two troops of cavalry followed closely
on their trail. Two other troops of cavalry were ordered from Fort
Elliott,
Texas,
about two hundred miles distant, to join in the pursuit, while the
infantry garrisons of
Forts
Dodge, Supply, and Lyon were ordered out along the
Arkansas
River to intercept or overtake the escaping band. Nor was this all.
Allowing for the failure of the more southern cordon of interceptors,
a second line of troops to watch for and cut off the escaping party
was formed along the line of the
Kansas
(Union) Pacific Railway.
And lest all these should fail,
further dispositions were made still to the north on the line of the
retreat along the Union Pacific Railroad in
Nebraska and
Wyoming
Territory, which the fleeing
Indians must cross on the way to their journeys end.
The first news of the refugees was
received just one week from the time of their escape. They were
reported on Bluff Creek, near the
Kansas
line, about two hundred miles from the point of departure, gathering
and killing cattle for their subsistence. Just five days after the
Cheyennes
were located on Bluff Creek a force of some two hundred men, including
some fifty citizens, came up with the
Indians on Sand Creek, and had a skirmish with them about dark.
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They were at once
attacked, Colonel Lewis leading the advance upon their position.
Unfortunately in the first assault he fell, mortally wounded. In the
temporary confusion resulting from this, night closing in, the
Indians
took advantage of the darkness to continue their flight. The following
morning the trail was followed, and on the morning of the 29th it was
discovered that the
Indians
had succeeded in escaping through the second line of troops, posted, with
a view to their interception, on the
Kansas
Pacific Railway.
The pursuit was at once commenced by all the
troops which had been watching the line of the
Kansas
Pacific road, as also the column which had fought the battle under Colonel
Lewis. The command of this force fell to Captain Mauck, of the Fourth
Cavalry, an officer of ability, courage, and energy, whose command being
infantry in wagons, and cavalry, was the only force in the field then fit
to pursue the well mounted
Cheyennes.
The
Indians on the days following the battle, in which they undoubtedly
lost considerably in killed and wounded, though only one
Indian
killed was found on the field, commenced murdering and devastating through
the settlements on the Beaver, the Solomon, and the Republican rivers,
killing every man they encountered, and stealing the horses they found. In
this way the
Cheyennes re-equipped themselves, while the pursuing force had to
continue the pursuit on jaded horses, many of which had marched farther
than had the
Indians.
In the mean time the utmost activity on
the part of the troops of another military department that of the Platte
prevailed, and a new line to intercept the fleeing hostiles was formed
along the Union Pacific Railway in
Nebraska. Though here the hope of
intercepting the savages was not great, as the line to be watched was
long, and the troops to occupy it were few, and as was feared the
Indians
passed through unseen. This practically put an end to all hope of
successful pursuit, as the country beyond was well known to the
Indians,
and by scattering in the sand hills of the Platte country they could defy
discovery. It only remains to follow with Mauck, the indomitable captain
of cavalry, to complete for the purposes of this paper the work of his
pursuit. After marching On an average forty miles for five days,
commencing September 30th, he came to the crossing by the
Indians
of the railway, and replenished his subsistence for men and animals, and
then crossing two rivers, the North and South Plattes, pursued the
fugitives for twenty-three miles. This was on October 5th. The next day,
which was his last in the pursuit, he marched forty miles. Here, in
consequence of orders, he swerved from the trail and sought a much needed
rest for his command.
The recital of the march
and pursuit, as it has been given in brief, conveys only a faint idea of
the trials, suffering, and anxieties in such an
Indian
campaign. Let us look at the facts. The command of Captain Mauck,
starting from Port Elliott and joining in the pursuit of the renegades,
marched seventeen consecutive days, making an aggregate of over
thirty-five miles a day. It crossed three important rivers, fought a
battle in which the field officer commanding the entire force was mortally
wounded, and traversed a distance of over six hundred miles, camping often
without wood or water, and suffering at times from extreme changes of
temperature cold at night and heat by day. In consequence of the wounding
of Colonel Lewis, the only medical officer with the command had to be left
behind, and yet in the face of the fact that a battle without medical
assistance meant an increased death rate in the command, this heroic
officer and his brave men pressed on, loaded with anxieties and nearly
exhausted with the exertion; and nothing could have saved the
Indians
from this unrelenting chase but their refurnishing themselves with fresh
horses in unlimited numbers just at the critical time of the pursuit.
It may he remarked, in
concluding the recital of the events of this campaign, that in the course
of two months after the cessation of the pursuit, this refugee band of
Cheyennes
were either annihilated or captured, and the remnant returned to the
distasteful reservation, where they were forced to live. It is not our
purpose to follow the troops in their sufferings from the intense cold of
winter during the completion of this work. The
Indians
protested that they would rather die, and by their own hands, than return
to the reservation. The desperateness of the struggle against savages
impelled by such sentiments can readily be imagined.
In speaking of this
campaign and those of two years preceding,
General Sheridan, in his report for the year, says: "These wars might
have been regarded as inevitable, and therefore a sufficient number of
soldiers should have been provided to meet them; but it was not done, and
hence the fatal results which followed. No other nation in the world would
have attempted the reduction of these wild tribes and occupation of their
country with less than 60,000 or 70,000 men, while the whole force
employed and scattered over the enormous region described never numbered
14,000 men, and nearly one-third of this force has been confined to the
line of the Rio Grande to protect the Mexican frontier. The consequence
was that every engagement was a forlorn hope, and was attended with a loss
of life unparalleled in warfare. No quarter was given by the savages, and
the officers and men had to enter upon their duties with the most
barbarous cruelties staring them in the face in case of defeat. It would
have been less expensive if an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men had been
maintained; and, moreover, the blood of gallant officers, soldiers, and
citizens would not have rested on our hands."
In the period before the
Civil War,
battling with the savages of our plains was quite a different matter.
Then, while the advantage of numbers was still on the side of the
Indian,
the whites had greatly the advantage in arms. There was then never any
hesitation on the part of an army detachment, however small, in attacking
any force of
Indians,
however large. The bow, tomahawk, and spear, rudely made, though
skillfully handled, were never a match for the firearms of the white man.
It was an unwritten law of the frontier, religiously observed, that arms
and ammunition should never, at any price, be furnished the
Indians.
This has all been changed. Now the most approved arms and the best
ammunition are accessible to the
Indian,
made so by the cupidity of the traders who infest the frontier; and the
Indian
today is a more dangerous foe than would be a like number of veteran
soldiers.
To prove this it is only necessary to compare the list of casualties in
recent Indian
wars with those among civilized nations, bearing in mind the numbers
engaged.
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