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The
Combatants of the Civil War |
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This gives the statistical key to the
startling contrasts which were so often noted by foreign correspondents at
the time, and which are still so puzzling in the absence of the key. The
whole normal life of the South was visibly changed by the war. But in the
North the inquiring foreigner could find, on one hand, the most steadfast
loyalty and heroic sacrifice, both in the Northern armies and among their
folks at home, while on the other he could find a wholly different kind of
life flaunting its most shameless features in his face. The theaters were
crowded. Profiteers abounded, taking their pleasures with ravenous greed;
for the best of their blood-money would end with the war.
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Federal Soldiers of the Civil War
This
image available for photographic prints
HERE!
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Everywhere there was the same fundamental
difference between the patriots who carried on the war and the
parasites that hindered them. Of course the two-thirds who made up the
war party were not all saints or even perfect patriots. Nor was the
other third composed exclusively of wanton sinners. There were, for
instance, the genuine settlers whom the Union Government encouraged to
occupy the West, beyond the actual reach of war. But the distinction
still remains.
Though sorely hampered, the Union
Government did, on the whole, succeed in turning the vast and varied
resources of the North against the much smaller and less varied
resources of the South. The North held the machinery of national
government, though with the loss of a good quarter of the engineers.
In agriculture of, all kinds both North and South were very strong for
purposes of peace. Each had food in superabundance. But the trading
strength of the South lay in cotton and tobacco, neither of which
could be turned into money without going north or to sea. In finance
the North was overwhelmingly strong by comparison, more especially
because Northern sea-power shut off the South from all its foreign
markets. In manufactures the South could not compare at all.
Northern factories alone could not supply
the armies. But finance and factories together could. The Southern
soldier looked to the battlefield and the raiding of a base for
supplying many of his most pressing needs in arms, equipment,
clothing, and even food-- for Southern transport suffered from many
disabilities. Fierce wolfish cries would mingle with the rebel yell in
battle when the two sides closed. "You've got to leave your
rations!"--"Come out of them clothes!"--"Take off them boots,
Yank!"--"Come on, blue bellies, we want them blankets!"
It was the same in almost every kind of
goods. The South made next to none for herself and had to import from
the North or overseas. The North could buy silk for balloons. The
South could not. The Southern women gave in their whole supply of silk
for the big balloon that was lost during the Seven Days' Battle in the
second year of the war. The Southern soldiers never forgave what they
considered the ungallant trick of the Northerners who took this
many-hued balloon from a steamer stranded on a bar at low tide down
near the mouth of the James. Thus fell the last silk dress, a queer
tribute to Northern seapower! Northern seapower also cut off nearly
everything the sick and wounded needed; which raised the death rate of
the Southern forces far beyond the corresponding death rate in the
North. Again, preserved rations were almost unknown in the South. But
they were plentiful throughout the Northern armies: far too plentiful,
indeed, for the taste of the men, who got "fed up" on the desiccated
vegetables and concentrated milk which they rechristened "desecrated
vegetables" and "consecrated milk."
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The Union Navy's
U.S.S. Sabine in 1864.
This
image available for photographic prints
HERE!
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There is the same tale to tell about transport
and munitions. Outside the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond the only places
where Southern cannon could be made were Charlotte in North Carolina,
Atlanta and Macon in Georgia, and Selma in Alabama. The North had many
places, each with superior plant, besides which the oversea munition world
was far more at the service of the open-ported North than of the
close-blockaded South. What sea-power meant in this respect may be
estimated from the fact that out of the more than three-quarters of a
million rifles bought by the North in the first fourteen months of the war
all but a beggarly thirty thousand came from overseas.
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Transport
was done by road, rail, sea, and inland waters. Other things being equal,
a hundred tons could be moved by water as easily as ten by rail or one by
road. Now, the North not only enjoyed enormous advantages in sea-power,
both mercantile and naval, but in road, rail, canal, and river transport
too. The road transport that affected both sides most was chiefly in the
South, because most maneuvering took place there. "Have you been through
Virginia?--Yes, in several places" is a witticism that might be applied to
many another State where muddy sloughs abounded. In horses, mules, and
vehicles the richer North wore out the poorer and blockaded South. Both
sides sent troops, munitions, and supplies by rail whenever they could;
and here, as a glance at the map will show, the North greatly surpassed
the South in mileage, strategic disposition, and every other way.
The South had only one through line from the
Atlantic to the Mississippi; and this ran across that Northern
salient which threatened the South from the southwestern Alleghenies. The
other rails all had the strategic defect of not being convenient for rapid
concentration by land; for most of the Southern rails were laid with a
view to getting surplus cotton and tobacco overseas. The strategic gap at
Petersburg was due to a very different cause; for there, in order to keep
its local transfers, the town refused to let the most important Virginian
lines connect.
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Taking sea-power in its fullest sense, to
include all naval and mercantile parts on both salt and fresh water, we
can quite understand how it helped the nautical North to get the
strangle-hold on the landsman's South. The great bulk of the whole
external trade of the South was done by shipping. But, though the South
was strong in exportable goods, it was very weak in ships. It owned
comparatively few of the vessels that carried its rice, cotton, and
tobacco crops to market and brought back made goods in return. Yankees,
Britishers, and Bluenoses (as Nova Scotian craft were called) did most of
the oversea transportation.
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Destruction of
the privateer Petrel by the St. Lawrence in 1862.
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Moreover, the North was vastly stronger than
the South on all the inland waters that were not "Secesh" from end to end.
The map shows how Northern sea-power could not only divide the South in
two but almost enisled the eastern part as well. Holding the Mississippi
would effect the division, while holding the Ohio would make the eastern
part a peninsula, with the upper end of the isthmus safe in Northern hands
between Pittsburgh, the great coal and iron inland port, and
Philadelphia, the great seaport, less than three hundred miles away. The
same isthmus narrows to less than two hundred miles between
Pittsburgh and Harrisburg (on the Susquehanna River); and its whole line
is almost equally safe in Northern hands. A little farther south, along
the disputed borderlands, it narrows to less than one hundred miles, .
from Pittsburgh to Cumberland (on the Potomac canal). Even this is not the
narrowest part of the isthmus, which is less than seventy miles across
from Cumberland to Brownsville (on the Monongahela) and less than fifty
from Cumberland to the Ohiopyle Falls (on the Youghiogheny). These last
distances are measured between places that are only fit for minor
navigation. But even small craft had an enormous advantage over road and
rail together when bulky stores were moved. So Northern sea-power could
make its controlling influence felt in one continuous line all round the
eastern South, except for fifty miles where small craft were concerned and
for two hundred miles in the case of larger vessels. These two hundred
miles of land were those between the Ohio River port of Wheeling and the
Navy Yard at Washington.
Continued Next Page
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